Reconsidering the trade-creating effects of a currency union by Michael R. Pakko & Howard J. Wall
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS
© 2001, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2001      37
Reconsidering the
Trade-Creating Effects
of a Currency Union
Michael R. Pakko and Howard J. Wall
C
ountries select particular exchange rate
arrangements for a variety of reasons. For
example, the ability to conduct an indepen-
dent monetary policy is often cited as the main
advantage of having a floating exchange rate
regime. Conversely, countries sometimes tie their
exchange rate to that of a larger country—foregoing
the ability to conduct independent monetary
policies—to benefit from the relative stability of the
foreign currency. This is the rationale for several
Latin American countries that have recently adopted
or are considering policies of dollarization.
A more prevalent rationale for adopting fixed
exchange rates or even common-currency arrange-
ments, however, is the notion that exchange rate
volatility introduces uncertainty into cross-border
transactions, reducing the volume of trade that
would otherwise take place. Indeed, this argument
played a key role in the decision of the European
Union to embark upon plans for introducing the
euro. As described in an early EU Green Paper on
the subject:
An exchange rate adjustment, even a moder-
ate one, may substantially alter the balance
of a contract between two European firms
and at the same time affect the relative
wealth of citizens and the purchasing power
of consumers. Only a single currency cover-
ing the largest possible number of Member
States can shelter firms and individuals from
these disruptions. (European Commission,
1995)
Despite the firmly held convictions of many
economists and policymakers that exchange rate
volatility and uncertainty dampens trade, there has
been little empirical evidence to support this
premise.1 Studies often find that the effect is of the
wrong sign (Brada and Mendez, 1988), statistically
insignificant (Belanger, Gutierrez, and Raynauld,
1992), or at best very weak (Frankel and Wei, 1993).
Recent theoretical work also suggests that the asso-
ciation may not hold in the context of general equi-
librium or for all forms of risk aversion (Bacchetta
and van Wincoop, 2000, and De Grauwe, 1988).
In a drastic departure from past empirical
studies that fail to find a significant link between
exchange rate stability and trade, a recent set of
papers by Andrew Rose and his colleagues find
extremely large positive effects of common curren-
cies on the volume of trade.  The most dramatic,
and widely cited, of his findings is that “two coun-
tries sharing the same currency trade three times
as much as they would with different currencies”
(Rose, 2000, p.7). 
In related work, Rose and Engel (2000) found
similarly large trade-creating effects by comparing
the extent of integration between countries with
common currencies to that of regions within the
same country. Other work (Frankel and Rose, 2000)
has combined estimates of the trade-creating effects
of common currencies with evidence of a link
between trade and growth, concluding that some
countries could increase their per capita income by
20 percent over 20 years by dollarizing or adopting
the euro. Most recently, Glick and Rose (2001) use
a much larger data set and find that a common
currency doubles trade.
Rose’s estimates of the trade-creating effects of
adopting common currencies are obtained using a
“gravity model” in which bilateral trade is a function
of the relative economic size and distance between
two trading partners. In general, these simple factors
can explain a great deal of observed trade patterns,
and gravity models are generally deemed to be
empirically successful. Rose’s model also includes
several variables that are intended to capture trading
partners’ cultural and historical links and member-
ship in regional trading blocs. The key feature of
Rose’s gravity model is the inclusion of two mone-
tary variables: a dummy variable to indicate whether
trading partners use the same currency and a mea-
sure of the volatility of the bilateral exchange rate. 
In this paper, we re-examine the trade-creating
effects of common currencies, replacing Rose’s
equation with a more general functional form.
1 See Côté (1994) for a comprehensive survey.
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geographic, and historical factors by introducing
particular variables, we allow for general fixed
effects that are specific to each trading pair. Estimat-
ing this modified form of the model, we find that
the trade-creating effects of common currencies
found by Rose disappear. This suggests a tenuous-
ness in the findings that should give one pause
before concluding that the potential gains from
adopting common currencies are as great as Rose
indicates.
COMPETING GRAVITY MODELS
To obtain his benchmark results, Rose uses
ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate an equation
that includes the typical gravity-model variables, as
well as a list of dummy variables intended to con-
trol for common historical and cultural influences
that might influence trade volumes. Specifically, he






where Xijt is the total real trade of country i with
country j in year t. The usual gravity variables are
Yit and Yjt, the gross domestic products (GDPs) of i
and j; yit and yjt, their real per capita GDPs; Dij, the
great-circle distance between them; and Contij, a
dummy variable to indicate whether they are con-
tiguous. The four time-invariant cultural and histor-
ical dummy variables take the value of 1 when the
partners (i) have a common first language, Langij;
(ii) are part of the same nation (for example, if they
are both French overseas departments), ComNatij;
(iii) were colonies of the same colonizer after 1945,
ComColij; or (iv) if one was a colony of the other,
Colonyij. To control for the trade-creating effects of
regional integration, the dummy FTAijt is equal to
1 when the partners are members of the same free
trade area or other form of regional integration
regime. The model also includes a vector of time
dummies, Tijt.
The variables of most present interest are the
two monetary variables: CCijt, a dummy that is equal
to 1 if i and j use the same currency; and V(eijt),
which is a measure of the volatility of the exchange
rate between the currencies of i and j. The latter is
the standard deviation of the first difference in the
log of the bilateral exchange rate between i and j for
the five years prior to the year of the observation.
We propose an alternative, more general
specification of equation (1) that uses trading pair–
specific fixed effects to control for time-invariant
geographic, cultural, and historical factors. Rather
than controlling for these factors with a list of par-
ticular variables, as Rose does, we use fixed effects
that are specific to each of the trading pairs (see
Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997, and Cheng and
Wall, 2001). 
The general advantage of this fixed-effects
approach is that it avoids estimation bias that can
arise because of misspecified or omitted time-
invariant factors that are correlated with bilateral
trade and some right-hand-side variables. For exam-
ple, there may be some unobserved (or uncontrolled-
for) factors that are responsible for both the level
of trade between two countries and whether or
not they have a common currency. If so, then any
estimation that does not control for such factors
would mistakenly attribute a correlation between
trade and a common currency to a direct link
between the two characteristics, rather than with
the unobserved attributes. In the context of the
present question, the fixed-effects approach has the
additional advantages of not having to use distance
to measure relative trading costs and of allowing
for a better empirical representation of the dynamic
link between common currencies and trade. 
We use least squares with dummy variables





Note that βij, the trading pair–specific component of
the intercept, incorporates all of the time-invariant
factors that are included separately in specification
(1); these include the distance and contiguity vari-
ables, as well as the time-invariant cultural and
historical factors included in (1). More importantly,
this fixed-effects term also controls for factors that
are not included in (1). In other words, rather than
explicitly controlling for the factors Langij, ComNatij,
ComColij, and Colonyij—and only those factors—
we allow the data to identify common characteristics
that influence the volume of trade between two
countries.
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REVIEWIn equation (2), the trading-pair fixed effect is
estimated using a separate dummy variable for each
trading pair in the data set, so that we need at least
two observations of each pair. Note also that we
refer to our fixed effects as “general” so as to differ-
entiate them from the restricted fixed effects that
have been used in other gravity models in the liter-
ature. As we demonstrate in the insert, these speci-
fications are special cases of (2) in that they can be
obtained by imposing arbitrary restrictions on the
general trading-pair effects.
The main benefit of the fixed-effects approach is
that it addresses the possibility of omitted-variables
bias by controlling for all factors that are fixed over
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RESTRICTED FIXED EFFECTS
The fixed-effects approach that we use is
the most general that has been applied to the
question of common currencies.1 It assumes
that, for each pair of countries, there is likely to
be a unique set of reasons for trade volume to
differ from the average. Unlike standard pooled
cross-section estimation, it allows for the possibil-
ity that cultural or historical factors can explain
why trade between the United States and the
United Kingdom is so much greater than trade
between, say, the United States and France. Al-
though fixed effects have been applied to gravity
models only recently, other fixed-effects specifi-
cations have appeared in the literature. 
Mátyás (1997) and Egger (2000) specify two
fixed effects for each country, one for when it is
an exporter and one for when it is an importer.







where θi is the fixed effect for i when it is an
exporter and ρj is the fixed effect for j when it is
an importer. Because distance, contiguity, and
language are not perfectly collinear with the fixed
effects, unlike in (2), they need not be dropped
from the regression. Note that equation (3) can
be obtained by imposing the arbitrary restriction
on (2) that βij=θi+ρj+Zij, where Zij ≡θ1lnDij+
θ2Contij+λ1Langij+λ2ComNatij+λ3ComColij+
λ4Colonyij. Because this also means that βik=θi+
ρk+Zik, these restrictions on the trading-pair
fixed effects imply the cross-pair restriction that
βij – βik=ρj –ρk+Zij –Zik. 
In this specification, the United States has
two fixed effects: one to control for the factors
that make its exports differ from the average
and another to do the same for its imports. The
trading-pair effect for U.S. exports to the United
Kingdom is the sum of the fixed effect for U.S.
exports and the fixed effect for U.K. imports.
Similarly, for U.S. exports to France, the trading-
pair effect is the sum of the fixed effect for U.S.
exports and the fixed effect for French imports.
Because the fixed effect for U.S. exports is part
of both of these trading-pair effects, this specifi-
cation imposes the arbitrary restriction on how
the two trading-pair effects are related to each
other and to all other trading-pair effects. As
shown by Cheng and Wall (2001), these arbitrary
restrictions result in poor in-sample predictions. 
A more restricted fixed-effects specification
than (3) was employed in Rose and van Wincoop
(2001) and in a working paper version of Rose
(2000) (<haas.berkeley.edu/~arose/>). In these
papers, there is one fixed effect for each country,
regardless of whether the country is the importer
or the exporter, i.e., θj=ρj. Applying this restric-







Using this specification of fixed effects, Rose
found that a common currency led countries to
more than double their bilateral trade.
1 See Cheng and Wall (2001) for a discussion of the various fixed-
effects specifications used in gravity models.the sample period, not only those included in the
estimation. Because the time-invariant factors that
these variables are meant to proxy for are often
difficult to measure or are unobservable, it is diffi-
cult (if not impossible) to include enough variables
to account for all of the important factors. 
The list of variables included by Rose is as
exhaustive as in any gravity model,2 yet there is
no variable, for example, that captures the unique
historical relationships between the United States
and Panama or the United States and Liberia. These
three countries all use the U.S. dollar; and there are
obvious historical reasons why they would (i) be
more likely than others to share a currency and (ii)
trade more than would be otherwise predicted.
Because the model does not control for factors such
as these, which are correlated with both trade and
the likelihood of sharing a currency, it cannot help
but provide biased estimates. It is not feasible to
create variables that capture the unique historical
relationships between these countries or, for that
matter, between any pair of countries. One cannot
create variables to control for every pair-specific
factor in the universe of trading pairs.3 The only
sensible solution is to include a dummy variable for
each pair that indicates trade between all pairs of
trading partners, i.e., to create trading pair–specific
fixed effects. 
Fixed-effects estimation also addresses the
possible problem of misspecification created by
the distance variable, which is meant to reflect the
relative costs of trading. However, distance is a
notoriously poor measure of such costs (Plane,
1984), and examples of why this is so come readily
to mind. First, the distance between single points
within two countries (usually the national capitals
or, as in the present case, the geographic centers)
can be a poor indicator of the trading distance
between people spread across millions of points
within the countries. Second, even without this
problem, in terms of trading costs, distance across
land is not the same as distance across an ocean.
And third, distance across relatively undeveloped
countries is not the same as distance across devel-
oped ones. The distance between Italy and Spain is
only slightly greater than that between Algeria and
Niger, but it is difficult to believe that trading costs
are lower for the latter pair. The misspecification
of trading costs that distance introduces will bias
empirical results because the error that it introduces
will likely be correlated with one or more of the
other right-hand-side variables, as well as with the
level of bilateral trade.
The most important consideration in the present
context is that fixed-effects estimation allows us to
get much better estimates of the dynamic relation-
ship between trade and common currencies. When
considering the question of a causal link between
adoption of a common currency and increased
trade, an obvious approach would be an examina-
tion of bilateral trade time series, including both pre-
and post-union observations. However, a relative
lack of observations with typical time series makes
this impractical for drawing any strong conclusions.
A feasible alternative pools the data both cross-
sectionally and over time, which can be used to
estimate a simple gravity model. 
One approach is to estimate a model such as
the one specified in (1), controlling for as many of
the time-invariant factors as possible and hoping
that the estimates are not biased because one or
more time-invariant factors are excluded or mis-
specified. The alternative that we propose captures
the dynamic link between common currencies
and trade by taking advantage of the fact that LSDV
estimation is econometrically identical to OLS
estimation of differences over time (see Hsiao, 1986,
or Greene, 1999). Thus, by controlling for all time-
invariant effects, our estimates should tell us the
changes in trade that occurred alongside changes
in common-currency status. Unfortunately, given
the data set, which has very few observations for
which there is a change in common-currency sta-
tus over the sample period, this approach is not
ideal.4 Nonetheless, as we demonstrate, it is suffi-
cient for identifying the source of Rose’s result, as
well as demonstrating its fragility: our empirical
estimates suggest the possibility that a common
currency may lead to significant reductions in trade.
THE DATA




2 In addition to the variables in equation (1), in other specifications
Rose includes dummies to indicate whether trading partners are
landlocked, are islands, or share the same head of state. 
3 For these three countries you could create two dummy variables:
one for when the trading pair includes a country that built a canal
through the other and another for when one was established by
freed slaves from the other.
4 Of the nearly 23,000 observations in the data set Rose used for his
benchmark estimate, only 7 have a change in common-currency status.33,903 observations of bilateral trade between
various combinations of 186 countries, dependen-
cies, territories, overseas departments, and other
political units for the years 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985,
and 1990. Of these observations, 330 are of trade
between trading partners that use the same cur-
rency.5 After eliminating the observations with
incomplete data, Rose obtains his benchmark
estimates with a pooled cross-section of 22,948
observations, 252 of which are of trade between
countries that use the same currency.6
Our selection criteria are slightly more stringent
than this because we need at least two observations
for each pair of trading partners. After eliminating
the observations that do not meet this additional
criterion, we are left with 21,758 bilateral trade
observations of 5,541 trading pairs, with 212 obser-
vations of trade between pairs that use the same
currency. 
One criticism of fixed-effects models is that
their estimates reflect short-run relationships of a
length defined by the time interval between obser-
vations, not the long-run relationships that pooled
cross-sections are intended to reveal. In the present
context, this view is of limited relevance because
the long run, the period over which no factors
related to trade are fixed, is a length of time that is
of no interest to policymakers or anyone else. The
relevant factors—distance, historical relationships,
cultural links, etc.—are not likely to become variable
at any time in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless,
because the five-year interval in Rose’s data set may
be too short for the affected economies to adjust
completely to adoption of a common currency,
we also estimate our model using 10- and 20-year
intervals.
Our second data set is a subset of the original
data that uses observations for 1970, 1980, and 1990
only. After eliminating those trading pairs with
only one observation in these three years, there are
11,520 observations of 4,392 pairs remaining, with
112 observations of trade between countries using
the same currency. A third data set uses only data
from 1970 and 1990, leaving 5,728 observations
of 2,864 trading pairs, with only 35 observations
of trade between trading partners using the same
currency. 
Although the first two data sets have roughly
the same percentage of observations for which
the partners use the same currency (just under 1
percent), the third one has a much smaller per-
centage (about 0.6 percent). Sample-selection bias
therefore becomes a potential problem for the third
data set: The country pairs for which data are less
likely to be complete tend to be the poorer ones,
and, as Rose points out, a disproportionate number
of countries using common currencies are relatively
poor. 
THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 summarizes the regression results for
the pooled cross-section and fixed-effects models
for the three data sets. The results for the pooled
cross-section model with five-year intervals are
nearly identical to Rose’s benchmark results, which
were obtained with about 1,200 more observations.
As with Rose’s benchmark, our estimated effect of
regional integration suggests that two members of
such a regime trade about 2.5 times (e
0.91=2.5)
what two countries not in the same regime would—
a huge effect that strains credulity. However, because
membership in a regional integration regime might
be correlated with missing or unobserved cultural
or historical factors, this number likely suffers from
the same estimation problems that we believe exist
for the effects of a common currency (see Cheng
and Wall, 2001). We also find, as did Rose, that
countries with a common currency trade more than
three times as much as they would if they had differ-
ent currencies (e
1.173=3.2).
The results of our estimation of the gravity
model with trading-pair fixed effects and the same
data with five-year intervals are dramatically differ-
ent from the results for the pooled cross-section
model. The estimated coefficient on the regional
integration dummy shrinks to a statistically insignifi-
cant 0.08 percent. The estimated effect of a common
currency indicates that two countries sharing the
same currency trade only 69 percent (e
–0.378=0.69)
of what they would trade if they had different cur-
rencies, although this trade-reducing effect is not
significantly different from zero statistically. Also,
the estimated coefficient on exchange rate volatility
shrinks to about one third of what the pooled cross-
section model produced. In short, the startlingly
large estimates of the effects of regional integration
and common currencies produced by Rose’s bench-
mark model disappear when trading-pair fixed
effects are used to model time-invariant factors.
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5 See Rose (2000) for a complete description of the data set.
6 He also estimated each year separately, finding little difference





























Regression Results: Dependent Variable=Log of Bilateral Exports
Five years  Ten years  Twenty years 
between observations between observations between observations
Pooled Pooled Pooled 
cross-section Fixed effects cross-section Fixed effects cross-section Fixed effects
Intercept –19.051 (0.264) –33.342 (2.009) –18.931 (0.359) –38.566 (2.499) –19.939(0.529) –40.490 (2.880)
Product of GDPs 0.791 (0.006) 1.340 (0.094) 0.778 (0.008) 1.493 (0.116) 0.780 (0.012) 1.529 (0.141)
Product of per capita  0.665 (0.011) –0.151 (0.093) 0.690 (0.016) –0.152 (0.119) 0.733 (0.022) –0.121 (0.141)
GDPs
Distance –1.081 (0.018) — –1.084 (0.024) — –1.059 (0.032) —
Contiguity 0.507 (0.086) — 0.488 (0.112) — 0.343 (0.150) —
Common language 0.392 (0.040) — 0.457 (0.052) — 0.456 (0.067) —
Common nation 1.374 (0.276) — 1.315 (0.366) — 0.662 (0.647) —
Common colonizer 0.663 (0.060) — 0.717 (0.082) — 0.887 (0.120) —
Colonial relationship 2.164 (0.074) — 2.098 (0.099) — 2.100 (0.142) —
Regional integration 0.912 (0.075) 0.079 (0.090) 0.756 (0.088) 0.048 (0.122) 0.698 (0.110) 0.059 (0.143)
Common currency 1.173 (0.143) –0.378 (0.529) 0.902 (0.195) –0.797 (0.421) 1.558 (0.370) –1.174 (0.563)
Exchange rate volatility –0.0183 (0.0022) –0.0051 (0.0020) –0.0157 (0.0025) –0.0054 (0.0026) –0.0100 (0.0028) –0.0066 (0.0034)
Total observations 21,758 11,520 5,728
Observations of 212 (0.97%) 112 (0.97%) 35 (0.61%)
common currency
Trading pairs 5,541 4,392 2,864
R
–2 0.626 0.854 0.639 0.841 0.665 0.828
Root-mean-squared error 1.980 1.236 1.894 1.255 1.796 1.288
Log-likelihood –38,184.43 –24,742.64 –19,701.53 –12,203.42 –94,88.98 –55,99.55
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are White-corrected standard errors. Estimates of the year dummies and trading-pair fixed effects are suppressed for space considerations.Independently, Rose (2001) obtains these same
results using the general fixed-effects model. How-
ever, he rejects the findings on the grounds that the
statistical insignificance of the common-currency
dummy is due to a small number of switches in
common-currency status. While it may well be true
that the statistical insignificance of the common-
currency dummy should not be taken to mean that
the effect is not positive, this misses the point. A
comparison of the two sets of results suggests that
pooled cross-section estimates are not reliable
because they are biased by the exclusion or mis-
measurement of trading pair–specific variables.
This is evident in the dramatically different coeffi-
cients on the GDP and per capita GDP variables
that are found when using the two methods. In
other words, the restrictions necessary to obtain
the pooled cross-section specification from the
fixed-effects specification are rejected, indicating
that the fixed-effects specification is preferred.7,8
The difference between the two methods in
their estimates of the trade-creating effect of a
common currency is a separate issue. The proper
conclusion to draw is that, when the statistically
preferred fixed-effects specification is used, there
is no statistically significant evidence of large trade
effects (positive or negative). Although this means
that Rose’s results cannot be supported statistically,
the small number of switches precludes us from
saying much about the effects of common curren-
cies on trade, although the tripling of trade found
by Rose is well outside of a 95 percent confidence
interval.9
As discussed above, the use of data with five-year
intervals might be misleading because five years
might not be a long enough period for the common
currency to have its full trade-creating effect. Our
results using data with 10- and 20-year intervals
between observations, however, indicate that, if any-
thing, the longer time interval magnifies the trade-
reducing effects of a common currency. Using the
data set with 10-year intervals, we find that countries
using the same currency traded only 45 percent
(e
–0.797=0.45) of what they would if they had differ-
ent currencies, an effect that is significantly differ-
ent from zero at the 6 percent level. And finally,
using the data set with 20-year intervals, we find
that countries using the same currency traded only
31 percent of what they would if they had different
currencies, an effect that is significant at the 4 per-
cent level. Remarkably, we find that the trade-
reducing effects in this data set are so consistent that
the coefficients on the common-currency dummies
are statistically significant despite there being so
few switches into or out of common currencies.
OTHER RESULTS
Our results, although statistically persuasive,
indicate only the source of Rose’s findings with his
original data set and are not necessarily useful for
making out-of-sample predictions of the effects of
a common currency. Using a new data set, Glick
and Rose (2001) compare results obtained with
pooled cross-estimation with those obtained with a
general fixed-effects specification, just as we have
done. Their data set has yearly observations of 230
countries from 1948 through 1997, with many more
observations of switches into and out of common
currencies; although, as in Rose’s original data set,
only about 1 percent of the sample covers country
pairs with a common currency. Their pooled cross-
section estimation using yearly observations indi-
cates that a common currency leads to a quadrupling
of trade, whereas their fixed-effects estimation
indicates that trade will be doubled. Further, they
find that this trade-creating effect is large even when
longer intervals are used, which is in contrast to
our results. They conclude that the fixed-effects
estimation shows that the effect of a common cur-
rency on trade “is economically large, statistically
significant, and seems insensitive to a number of
perturbations in…methodology.”
Rather than closing the book on the issue, these
results actually point to the general sensitivity of
the empirical approach. This is because the two sets
of results, ours and those of Rose and Glick, were
obtained with two equally reasonable data sets that
nonetheless differ a great deal in their handling of
common currencies. Many of the country pairs
noted to share a common currency in one data set
do not even appear in the other data set; and, even
for the country pairs that do appear in both data
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7 A likelihood ratio test easily rejects the hypothesis that the restrictions
do not lead to statistically different results.
8 As suggested by Mátyás (1998) and Egger (2000), we tested whether
the factors omitted from the pooled cross-section are random (uncor-
related with the independent variables) rather than fixed (correlated
with the independent variables). A Hausman test easily rejects the
random effects model. Given the discussion in Egger (2000) of the
reasons why the fixed effects model is preferred a priori, this is not
surprising. 
9 The lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval
are that a common currency will lead countries to trade, respectively,
24 percent and 193 percent as much with each other.sets, the data sets often disagree on whether the
countries had a common currency. For example, of
the 85 country pairs in the Rose-Glick data set that
are described as having shared a currency in 1975,
only 37 (44 percent) even appear in Rose’s original
data set, and 15 (41 percent) of these are indicated
as having different currencies. Also, of the 52 coun-
try pairs in Rose’s original data set that are noted to
have shared a currency in 1975, only 26 (50 per-
cent) also appear in the Rose-Glick data set, 5 of
which (19 percent) are indicated as having different
currencies.
CONCLUSIONS
Although economists have long considered
exchange rate stability and common-currency
arrangements to provide for enhanced trading
opportunities, very little empirical support for this
notion has been uncovered over the years. Rose’s
estimates of the trade-creating effects of common
currencies are so provocative because they depart
so dramatically from the dearth of evidence support-
ing this widely held belief.
Our results suggest, however, that the evidence
is much weaker than indicated by Rose’s estimates;
we conclude that Rose’s results are not robust with
respect to a general specification of time-invariant
determinants of trade volume. Although the robust-
ness question may appear to have been settled by
Rose’s impressive array of alternative specifications,
our results indicate otherwise. In short, Rose’s
remarkable finding that a common-currency
arrangement triples the volume of trade is due to
estimation bias arising from omitted or misspeci-
fied variables that are correlated with trade volume
and with the likelihood that countries use a common
currency. 
Using three different subsets of Rose’s data to
estimate a generalized fixed-effects model, our
point estimates indicate that common-currency
arrangements are associated with reduced trade.
Using the data sets with longer intervals between
observations, these results are even statistically
significant. The fact that the evidence supporting
trade-reducing effects of a currency union strength-
ens with the lengthening of the interval may simply
be an artifact of the paucity of time-series informa-
tion in the data set. With such a limited number of
regime switches represented in the data, it may not
be possible for the gravity approach to answer the
key question of what happens to trade between two
countries after they adopt a common currency.10 
Our results should not be interpreted literally
as demonstrating that a common currency will
lead to a much lower volume of trade, particularly
in light of the findings of Glick and Rose (2001).
Indeed, such a result may strain credulity as much
as Rose’s finding of a tripling of trade. At the very
least, though, one should be cautious about drawing
any broad conclusions about the effects of common
currencies on trade given that such a wide range
of values can be estimated using this data set, and
that the opposite sign can be obtained using a differ-
ent and equally reasonable data set.
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